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Abstract
The present paper concentrates on the nature and structure of inter-store price competition. It
focusses especially on price competition between different retailers within one trading area and
within one product category. Six theoretically founded hypotheses postulate competitive relations
between manufacturers’ UPCs and the retailers covering various possible competitive conditions
such as competitive independencies or various degrees of competitive dependency among the
UPCs and the retailers. These hypotheses have been tested empirically with store-level scanner
data. UPC is the Universal Product Code, the most dominant coding technology in the United
States. It allows for point-of-sale (POS) scanning systems and to continuously collect data by
item at the retail level. The retail prices of 27 UPCs from a five stores suburban market place
measured over 104 weeks are analyzed by using the three-mode component analysis to determine
the basic and important competitive conditions in the market under study. On the basis of the
estimated component structure of the UPCs, of the stores and of the weeks as well as on the basis
of the core array, which provides the information of how the components of different modes
(here UPCs, stores, and weeks) are related to each other the appropriateness of the six research
hypotheses is tested. The empirical results support the theoretical implications that the price
competition between UPCs and retailers in one product category and one trading area is primarily
determined by manufacturers’ pricing strategies. The manufacturer “set” the retail prices (shelf
prices and temporary price reductions) by deciding on the number and size of the trade deals
whereas the retailers exert passive pricing strategies by passing some or most of the trade deals
through to their consumers.
KEYWORDS: Pricing Research, Game Theory, Price Competition among Manufacturers and
Retailers, Empirical Industrial Organization
21.  Introduction
This paper investigates the pattern of price competition among manufacturers’ UPCs and retailers
within one product category and one trading area. The research focusses in particular on the
impact of UPCs’ prices on the pricing strategies and the pricing behavior of competing UPCs in
the same store or in competing stores. As such, pattern of price reactions and pattern of price
discipline between UPCs and retailers will be investigated at the retail level. The results will
provide additional insight into the nature and structure of price competition between
manufacturers and retailers in a common trading area. This knowledge is important for the
effective formulation of retail strategies and marketing tactics of both manufacturers and retailers.
The research bases on (game) theoretically founded hypotheses about the pattern of inter-store
price competition. In the empirical study their congruence is prooved with empirical indicators in
order to derive conclusions about the nature of price competition at the retail level. The study is
based on store tracking and scanner panel data from a five store (four chain) suburban
marketplace.
The pattern of inter-store price competition determine to what extent stores’ or retailers’ prices
affect the price competition between competing stores or retailers within the product category. A
possible pattern of price competition could be a retailer dropping the price for an UPC when that
same UPC is price-reduced by another retailer, but several other explanations are possible. One
retailer might reduce the price of a larger size of the same brand (i.e. an UPC to a different UPC
of the same brand reaction) or even react across different brands in the same category. Price
changes at the retail level can therefore not only affect sales of the promoting brand and its
competitors but may also cause competitive reactions that can result in an increase or decrease of
competing brands’ price pomotions. However, competitive reactions can occur simultaneously or
– more realistically - at various time lags. The general rule of (positive) cross-store price
elasticity of demand to indicate competition between retailers is for these reasons not specific
enough to provide guidelines. The problem of price competition at the retail level is also related
to the question, if one retailer can discipline the prices of another retailer by actions in a category
that are unrelated to the brand being disciplined. Moreover, does market discipline have to occur
simultaneously or is competitive response anywhere within the inter-purchase interval sufficient
to discipline competitive prices? Price discipline across brands or across retailers can be regarded
as (implicit) collusion of manufacturers or retailers in a given market. However, price
3competition at the retail level can also be determimed by manufacturers’ actions. In that case,
retailers’ pricing decisions are managed by manufacturers and retailers do not engage in active
pricing strategies. Hence price competition is driven by the manufacturers.
The investigation of the pattern of inter-store competition starts with a literature survey of
empirical studies and game theoretical models that are related to the problem of inter-store
competition. As a matter of fact, they did not focus primarily on the nature of price competition
among UPCs and stores and the impact of prices within certain stores on the pricing strategies in
competing stores. But certainly the literature review will provide the necessary framework for the
development of hypotheses with respect to our research problem.
The empirical study is then conducted to test the theoretically founded research hypotheses. It is
based on the retail prices from weekly store-level scanner data of different UPCs from one
product category measured in different stores of one trading area. In difference to previous
studies the pattern of inter-store price competition will therefore not be determined from the
response of sales or market shares to the retail prices within and across stores but rather from an
investigation of the retail prices themselves. We provide the three-mode component analysis as
methodological framework to determine the pattern of inter-store competition. In our case the
three-mode component analysis uncovers the basic competitive determinants across UPCs, stores
and time and will enable us to understand the pricing behavior and the price competition between
stores and UPCs. For this reason we will not only derive the hypotheses but also postulate their
implications on a possible three-mode component solution.
Consistently the paper has the following structure. Section two will give a literature review on
empirical studies and game theoretical models that can guide the development of the research
hypotheses. Section three then provides the mathematical framework of the three-mode
component analysis that is used within our empirical study to test the research hypotheses. The
hypotheses, their reasoning and their implications on the possible three-mode component
solution, are discussed in detail in the fourth section. Section five then presents the empirical
study and the implications for the confirmation or rejection of the research hypotheses. The
empirical study will prove the congruence of the theoretically postulated structure of the
hypotheses with the empirically measured component structure of the three-mode analysis. The
4paper concludes in section six with a general discussion about the congruence of theoretical and
empirical patterns of inter-store competition.
2.  Literature Review
2.1  Empirical studies
Empirical studies have tackled the problem of inter-store price competition within the framework
of store choice models and sales response models. With respect to our research problem we will
consider the work of Bucklin and Lattin (1992), Walters (1991), Kumar and Leone (1988) and
Leeflang and Wittink (1992).
To begin with, the effects of price promotions on the sales of brands within and across stores
have been investigated by Kumar and Leone (1988) at the store-level. Contrary to the
subsequently mentioned studies, Kumar and Leone can show that on the basis of their store-level
scanner data and using a sales response model price promotions, featuring and display activities
do not only increase the sales of that brand within the store but they also increase the substitution
of stores and thus produce across store competitive effects.
Walters (1991) has investigated in his study the impact of retail price promotions on consumer
purchasing patterns and the performance of competing retailers. On the basis of store-level
scanner data Walters shows a significant effect of price promotion on the sales of the promoted
brand within the store. These promotions have often effectively stimulated sales of
complementary products within the store but the results do not support the hypothesis that the
sales of a brand in one store are affected by price promotional activities of the brand or of its
substitutes and complements in a competing store.
Bucklin and Lattin (1992) have proposed a model of product category competition between
grocery retailers that bases on a brand choice model, a model of category purchase incidence and
a store choice model. They combine these three models within a single framework and
investigate determinants of store competition. Bucklin and Lattin, in particular, find indirect store
competition caused by households that regularly visit more than one grocery store and by
households that show purchase acceleration. It’s an interesting result that no direct effects of
5store-competition have been detected. The influence of within-category marketing activity,
however, proves to be a direct effect on the probability of store choice.
Leeflang and Wittink (1992) have investigated competitive reactions to price and promotional
activities using store-level scanner data. They distinguish between parallel movements, retailer-
dominated and manufacturer-dominated reactions. Parallel movements are price activities of two
brands in the same week which are characterized by a positive relation between competing prices
of the brands. Retailer-dominated reactions may occur if a price decrease of one brand in a
particular week is followed by a promotional activity of another brand in the following week. If
retailer activities are motivated by manufacturers’ trade promotions, the nature and frequency of
such activities for competing brands may reflect competitive reactions by manufacturers. These
reactions can only be observed if the retailers cooperate or if the channel is dominated by the
manufacturers. In their empirical study Leeflang and Wittink use causality tests to establish direct
and lag effects (up to 10 periods) of the promotional activities of one brand on the promotional
activities of the other brands. The empirical results show that the estimated competitive reactions
are very complex. Leeflang and Wittink report various causal relationships between brands
within and across promotional instruments. In case of temporary price reductions the study
reveals parallel price reactions, retailer-dominated short-run and long-run as well as
manufacturer-dominated price reactions.
Though the approaches discussed above have shed some light on the nature of price competition
between stores/retailers, they are not able to detect the real pattern of inter-store competition. The
empirical study by Bucklin and Lattin (1992) and Walters (1991) as well as the study by Kumar
and Leone (1988) use a priori defined response models to detect and measure the extent of store
competition or store choice. These approaches decidedly depend on the correct specification of
the possible patterns of inter-store competition. However, the patterns of inter-store competition
especially are not known a priori and therefore response models may not reveal the true pattern.
Competitive price reactions between stores may appear across UPCs or across brands and the
time lags of a price reaction to competitive price movements may vary over time because stores
may not be perfectly informed about temporary price changes in competing stores. The empirical
study by Leeflang and Wittink is impaired by the fact that only aggregate scanner panel data are
used. Conclusions about retailer- or manufacturer-dominated price strategies are derived from the
causal relationship between prices across different time lags.
62.2  Game theoretical price models
Extant research on price and price competition have examined the effects of prices and price
competition on sales and shares. E.g. inventory cost transfers and price discrimination have been
postulated as possible reasons for the occurance of price promotions (e.g. Blattberg, Eppen &
Lieberman 1981; Jeuland & Narasimhan 1985; Narasimhan 1984). With respect to the price
competition between UPCs within and across stores game theoretical models may provide a
valuable theoretical basis for investigating the nature of price competition (see also Moorthy
1985). Several established game theoretical models will be reviewed in the next paragraphs to
develop research hypotheses about the pattern of inter-store competition.
Let us first consider a simple two-firm non-cooperative game. Firm A gets the highest pay-off if
it is on price promotion and firm B offers at regular prices. Similarly, highest profits for firm B
can be assumed if firm B is on price promotion and firm A sells at regular prices. If one firm
receives the highest pay-off then the other firm will automatically receive the lowest possible
profit. Both firms receive high profits if they do not engage simultaneously in price promotions
and they get low profits if they perform price promotions within the same time-period. This pay-
off scenario results in the well-known prisoner’s dilemma in which both firms have incentives to
price promote and therefore both firms will receive only small pay-off. The idea of the prisoner’s
dilemma has frequently been attributed to engagement of manufacturers and retailers in price
promotions. With respect to the pattern of inter-store competition problem we might observe
behavior according to the prisoner’s dilemma if each store/retailer engages in price promotions
every week for at least one of its UPCs of a particular product category.
However, the pay-off of price promotions should be higher if retailers or manufacturers
coordinate their pricing strategies. Axelrod (1980a, 1980b, 1981) has investigated strategies for
this type of game. He shows that a “tit-for-tat” strategy results in the highest profits. A firm that
engages in a “tit-for-tat” strategy always follows the moves of its opponent, which means that the
firm promotes if a competitor promotes and the firm stops promoting if the competitor stops
promoting. However, with respect to the pattern of competition problem the manufacturers can
only execute a “tit-for-tat” strategy if they control price and price promotions at the retail level
which is rather unrealistic for frequently purchased products that are sold in department stores or
grocery shops. If retailers are able to perfectly observe the pricing of competing retailers they
7may set up a pure “tit-for-tat” strategy. We can observe a “tit-for-tat” strategy at the retail level if
the pricing strategies of two retailers are perfectly correlated. Looking into one product category,
prices should be matched at the UPC-level as each retailer follows the pricing strategy of another
retailer separately for each UPC within the product category.
Let us now consider another classical game, the battle of the sexes game. Two firms can earn
asymmetric profits if both actions match, but they will earn no profits if their actions do not
match. Each firm chooses its own strategy (shelf prices vs. price promotions). Assuming that a
price promotion of firm A yields only profits if firm B runs a promotion for the same UPC at the
same time period. The question will arise in which way a firm can implement collusive behavior
among the manufacturers or retailers. If firms face this pay-off situation, price promotions should
be positively correlated for each UPC. In addition to that it is also possible that promotions will
not occur for a long time period. The pricing strategies of the stores should be almost matched for
each UPC and within each time period. But the battle of the sexes game may also be interpreted
in a way that firms can only realize high pay-offs if they do not promote at the same time. In that
case the promotions will be negatively correlated and the stores should match their pricing
strategies so that no UPC is on sale in more than one store at the same time.
So far we dealt with pure strategies only, the firms (manufacturer or retailer) execute a price
promotion in a particular week or they don’t. In difference to a pure strategy the behavior of
firms may also be investigated on the basis of mixed strategies. Firms follow a mixed strategy if
they do not choose a certain strategy. Their market behavior is rather described by a probability
distribution and the outcome of the game is the result of a random process.
Varian (1980) has developed a model on the basis of mixed strategy behavior in which temporary
price reductions are used to discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. Retailers
charge low prices in a “randomizing” way in order to attract informed consumers. Uninformed
consumers who accidentially go to a low-priced store cannot use this past knowledge of low
priced stores to shop efficiently. Using the randomization argument, the Varian model fixes the
optimal high or low prices which retailers should charge. Though Varian’s model may appear
unrealistic, as retailers do not randomize their prices, the key concept is based on the condition
that the consumers cannot anticipate when an item is promoted.
8Narasimhan (1988) has developed a model that explains promotions through the existence of
brand-loyal consumers and brand switchers. Manufacturers reduce prices for the retailers that
then determine which promotion is to pass through. The retailer has a motivation different from
that of the manufacturer. The retailer wants to attract traffic to the store or gain incremental sales
for the category. Strong brands are more desirable for the retailers to promote because more
consumers will purchase the product and consumers will be more likely to change stores to shop
for a strong brand. Thus whereas the manufacturers of weak brands may promote more
frequently, a higher percentage of their promotions will not reach consumers. On the other hand,
the strong brands may promote less often, but in case they promote the retailers are more likely to
pass the trade deal through.
Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990) have also introduced a mixed strategy model where differencies
in brand loyalty are related to variations in the size and frequency of price promotions across
brands. The loyalty of a brand is operationalized as the price differential needed to make
consumers switch from their preferred brand to a competing brand. As a key result it is shown
that in equilibrium the brand with larger loyalty promotes less frequently than the brand with
lower loyalty. In addition to that, the likelihood of engaging in price promotions for certain
brands increases as the number of brands in the product category increases. The model also
predicts that weaker brands (brands with low loyalty) can gain more from price promotions.
The equilibrium outcome in Varian’s model as well as in Narasimhan’s model and in the model
of Raju, Srinivasan and Lal is a mixed strategy. Each firm engages in probabilistic price
promotions in a random manner. Competing firms are therefore uncertain about their
competitors’ strategies. Competitors do not know competitors’ actions but only the probability of
a possible action. Regarding the problem of the pattern of competition between manufacturers
and retailers, price promotions are uncorrelated across UPCs and across stores if the stores are
unconstrained in setting their prices. If the manufacturers set the retail prices, the price
promotions will be correlated within brands and across stores but uncorrelated across brands and
across stores.
Lal (1990) has extended the previous studies by introducing a third, regional brand. He
investigates the influence of manufacturer trade deals on retail price promotions using the
concept of price tiers with three manufacturers (two national brands, one local brand) and one
9retailer. In difference to the idea of interpreting a mixed strategy equilibrium as price promotion
(Varian 1980; Narasimhan 1988; Raju, Srinivasan & Lal 1990) Lal models the competition
between firms so that price promotions can be a result of a long-run profit maximizing
equilibrium strategy. Consumers are assumed to be either loyals who buy national brands or
switchers who buy on the price relation of the three brands. A fundamental result is that the
national brands must alternate trade deals in order to serve the switching segment without having
to offer a lower price to their loyal consumers all the time. The national brands cooperate to
defend against the possible incursion by the local brand. The local brand forces the national
brands to offer trade promotions, which in the absence of the local brand would not occur. The
results also show that only one of the manufacturers of a national brand should offer a trade deal
in any period. Given the fact that it is not in the retailer’s interest to promote both national brands
at the same time, manufacturers will decide on the frequency of promotions but may leave the
sequencing decision to the retailer.
What is the effect if there are more than one retailer, e.g. two large grocery chain stores? In that
case the customers are classified as store-loyal or as store hoppers and both may also be grouped
as brand-loyal or brand switchers. Just as the national brands can cooperate in an infinite-horizon
repeated game; the chain stores will have the same incentives to develop similar cooperation in
setting the retail prices of the products. Both stores will charge the same price for all the products
in every period, even if these prices will change in course of time (perfect Nash equilibrium). If
the two bigger chain stores also compete against small stores it is optimal for them to collude. As
a result temporal price dispersion exists within a store and spatial price dispersion across chain
stores so that no national brand is promoted at the same time at both stores. The equilibrium
outcome in Lal’s model is an implicit collusion in a repeated game. The collusion is enforced
through a purely non-cooperative mechanism (one facet of the Folk theorem, e. g. Friedman
1977). With respect to the pattern of competition problem the price promotions of the leading
brands are negatively correlated.
These basic game theoretical models and their model instrinsic implications are now the basis for
the development of our research hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical study. The
research hypotheses will postulate possible pattern of inter-store competition and make
assumptions regarding the price competition at the retail level. But before discussing these
hypotheses we will discuss the methodological concept of the three-mode component analysis.
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The three-mode component analysis will uncover and detect the pattern of price competition
among the stores and therefore enable us to empirically test the theoretically founded hypotheses.
3.  Research methodology
The data for the investigation of the pattern of inter-store competition are the retail prices of the
UPCs in different stores across time. These data, collected from different UPCs within different
stores across time form a three-dimensional array which is described by three different modes
(UPCs, stores, and weeks) and where the term mode refers to different entities that build the
three-way array (the data will be described in detail within the paragraph of the empirical study).
This data array holds the key to understanding pricing behavior and price competition between
stores and UPCs across time.
The price patterns of the UPCs indicate which UPCs follow an identical or similar pattern across
time and which UPCs have identical or similar price patterns within different stores. These
similar or identical patterns may provide the basis to aggregate these UPCs into entities of a
higher level (e.g. sub-brands or brands). The price patterns of the stores indicate if the stores exert
similar pricing strategies, if stores’ pricing strategies are identical across time and if stores’
pricing strategies are identical for all or a subset of UPCs. The weekly observations indicate
which prices of the UPCs in the stores are regular prices or temporary price reductions. Thus, the
weeks provide additional information about the pricing strategies of the stores and UPCs in the
data set.
Numerous methods have been developed, primarily in the psychometric literature (e.g. Kiers
1991, Kroonenberg 1992) for the exploratory analysis of such three-mode, three-way data. The
most general method that decomposes the three-way array into three sets of components is the
Tucker3 model. Tucker (1966) proposed this model for the three-mode principal components
analysis that reduces the dimensionality of all three modes to describe the information in the data.
Algebraically the Tucker3 model can be written as
     
   

P
p
Q
q
R
r
ijtpqrtrjqipijt egcbax
1 1 1
(1)
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where ijtx  is an entry of the three-way data array with mi ,...,1  UPCs, Jj ,...,1  stores and
Tt ,...,1  time periods. For interpretational purposes it is convenient to express the Tucker3-
model in matrix notation using the Kronecker product )(  .
EBCAGX 	
 )( (2)
X  is a  )( TJm dimensional matrix where the prices of the m  UPCs in the J  stores are placed
side by side for each of the T  periods. ipa  is the ),( pi element of the  )( Pm dimensional
component matrix A  which shows how strongly the i-th UPC is related to the p-th component
among the UPCs. The coefficient jqb  is the ),( qj element of the  )( QJ dimensional
component matrix B  which shows how strongly the j –th store is related to the q-th store-
component. The coefficient ctr  is the ),( rt element of the  )( RT dimensional component
matrix C  and shows how strongly the t-th week is related to the r-th week-component. G  is the
so-called core array which is itself a three-mode three-way array. The element gpqr  indicates how
strongly component p of the UPC mode interacts with component q of the store mode and
component r of the time mode.
Each squared element of the core array ( 2pqrg ) indicates how much the combination of the p-th
component of mode A, the q-th component of mode B and the r–th component of mode C
contribute to the overall fit of the model (Kroonenberg 1983, p. 158). For the presentation of the
empirical results we also have to emphasize that the three-dimensional core array can be sliced
into frontal, horizontal and lateral two-dimensional core matrices. The frontal core matrices
represent in our notation the relation of the P  UPC-components with the Q  store-components
for a particular week-component. As such the horizontal core matrices indicate the relationship
between the Q  store-components and the R  week-components for each UPC-component. The
lateral core matrices on the other hand represent the relationship between the P  UPC-
components and the R  week-components for each store-component. The model is usually not
decomposed into all possible components, but only into the first P, Q, and R components,
respectively, with TRJQmP   , , , to provide a reduced-rank approximation. The elements
ijte  contain the errors resulting from the approximation. The model parameters can be estimated
by the alternating least squares algorithm TUCKALS3 outlined by Kroonenberg and de Leeuw
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(1980). For further details and a marketing application see also Cooper, Klapper and Inoue
(1996).
4.  Research Hypotheses
On the basis of the theoretical discussion about possible patterns of inter-store competition, we
can now conduct various hypotheses regarding the pattern of competition between stores and
UPCs/brands in order to answer the central research questions how retailers’ prices affect the
price competition between competing stores and whether the retailers’ pricing decisions will
discipline the pricing decisions of other retailers within the same product category (within and
across UPCs and brands). With respect to the statistical methodology which will be applied to
test the hypotheses we can also derive the implications of the research hypotheses on the
component structure of the three-mode component model. This will enable us to verify or to
reject the research hypotheses within the empirical analysis. All UPCs are assumed to belong to
the same product category and some UPCs are part of a brand. The stores may belong to a retail
chain so that pricing decisions may be determined by the chain rather than by the individual store
itself. We assume an oligopolistic market structure, both for the manufacturers and for the
retailers within on trading area. Thus manufacturers and retailers are competing within the same
market for the same customers. The postulated hypotheses can be generalized across different
markets. We do not postulate hypotheses regarding retailers’ locations (e.g. Hotelling 1929)
because in the oligopolistic market considered here we assume all retailers to compete with each
other.
Hypothesis 1: Stores set their prices completely independently without any competitive
constraints.
According to the results of Varian and Narasimhan and also Raju, Srinivasan and Lal the price
promotions should be uncorrelated across UPCs and stores if the stores are unconstrained in
setting their prices.
What are the implications of this hypothesis on the pricing strategies and the pricing behavior of
the stores and the UPCs across time? The retail prices should be uncoordinated (and also
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uncorrelated) across stores if stores belong to different retail chains. With respect to the three-
mode component analysis the store-mode should give as many components as there are retail
chains in the data set. If, on the other hand, the stores of a chain are independent in their pricing
behavior, we can expect as many store-components as there are stores. What are the implications
of this hypothesis for the estimation of the UPC-components? If the prices of the UPCs are set
without competitive pressures and independently of the prices of the other UPCs we then expect
the prices of the UPCs within and across stores to be uncoordinated and uncorrelated. The three-
mode component analysis should retain as many UPC-components as there are UPCs.
Two additional scenarios are possible. First, a store may coordinate the prices of the UPCs within
a brand. In that case we can expect to get as many UPC-components as there are brands. A
second alternative, however, is that the stores might coordinate the prices of their UPCs across
brands according to additional features such as package sizes or flavors.
Which implications will arise for the week-components? Independent pricing strategies across
UPCs (brands) and stores should result in as many week-components as there are independent
pricing strategies. We will get week-components for each UPC in each store if a UPC engages in
an unsystematical way in price promotions. If the number of UPCs times stores exceeds the
number of weeks we can expect as many week-components as there are weeks.
According to hypothesis “1” the store-components, UPC-components and the week-components
represent independent pricing behavior. Therefore the size of the entries in the core array can not
vary substantially so that no UPC-component, store-component and week-component should
dominate other three-mode combinations.
Hypothesis 2: The pricing strategies of the stores and UPCs are locked in a competitive
situation according to a prisoner’s dilemma.
According to this hypothesis price promotions for one UPC are offered in every week
irrespectively to which brand the price-promoted UPC belongs although we expect in each week
only one UPC of a brand on sale in each store as the brands (manufacturers) are also trapped into
the pay-off situation described by the prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore manufacturers will stimulate
price promotions at the retail level by offering trade deals to the retailers in order to encourage
them to pass the trade through to the consumers.
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What are the implications of this hypothesis on the three-mode component structure? The prices
of the UPCs should be uncoordinated across brands but we may get brand-components because
manufacturers and retailers will coordinate the prices of the UPCs within brands. The analysis of
the store-components should retain as many components as there are retail chains if the prices in
a retail chain are coordinated. The component analysis of the weeks should give one dominant
(general) week-component like a general component/factor that represents the high intensity of
competition. In addition to this general component, some components of minor relevance should
explain for the pricing behavior that is characteristic for certain UPCs and/or stores across the
weeks.
The maximum of information in the core array is provided by the first frontal core slice that
characterizes the interaction of UPC-components and store-components for the general
component of the weeks. This first frontal core slice should have entries of equal size for all
possible combinations of UPC-components and store-components. The other slices of the core
array represent special interactions between store-components and UPC-components. The sizes
of these core entries, however, should be small compared to the entries of the first frontal core
slice.
Hypothesis 3: The pricing strategies of two retailers follow a “tit-for-tat” rule.
This hypothesis postulates that the pricing behavior of two retailers is perfectly matched. It is a
pure strategy that assumes identical price movements for each UPC across different retailers.
Stores that engage in a “tit-for-tat” strategy have identical price strategies across UPCs.
According to this hypothesis the three-mode component analysis will retain one store-component.
We expect to get as many UPC-components as there are brands if the manufacturers coordinate
their pricing strategies within brands. In addition to that, stores may also coordinate prices within
brands. As all stores follow the same pricing strategy we should get as many week-components
as there are different pricing strategies of the UPCs/brands (no more different week-components
than there are UPCs in the data set). The two-dimensional core array will characterize the
relationship between UPC-components and week-components. No assertions can be given for the
entries in the core array.
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Hypothesis 4: The pricing strategies of the stores are coordinated in order to maximize (joint)
channel profits.
This hypothesis has to be inspected from two different standpoints. First, the pricing strategies of
the stores could be matched for each UPC within and across time to realize the maximum profit.
In that case the prices of the UPCs across stores will be positively correlated. Secondly, the
pricing strategies are coordinated in such a way that no UPC is price-promoted in more than one
store at the same time. In this case the prices of the UPCs within and across stores will be
negatively correlated.
Which pattern can be expected in the three-mode analysis? Stores that coordinate their prices are
represented in a common store component. The UPC-components may represent brand-
components if stores or manufacturers coordinate the prices within brands. If the pricing
strategies are positively correlated across UPCs we expect week-components that do not contrast
the pricing behavior of the UPCs across stores. If on the other hand the prices of the UPCs are
negatively correlated we expect to get contrasting week-components for these pricing strategies.
As only one store component is retained the core array will be the two dimensional lateral core
slice which characterizes the interactions of the UPC-components and the week-components. Its
entries will be higher for the UPC-components and week-components combinations where the
brands represented by the UPC-component and the brands whose price promotions are described
by the week-components are identical.
Hypothesis 5: The manufacturers “set” the retail prices.
This hypothesis implies that in one way or other the manufacturer exerts an influence on the retail
price. We interpret hypothesis “5” as such that the manufacturers have no direct influence on the
shelf prices but may influence the number of price promotions at the retail level by offering trade
deals to the retailers. Trade deals stimulate the retailers to pass the price advantage for one UPC
or a couple of UPCs through to the consumers. However, manufacturers may not offer trade deals
for all UPCs of their brands; they will eventually offer trade deals only for UPCs with relative
high market shares (e.g. the most popular package size or the favorite flavor). Hence, the three-
mode component analysis may find UPC-components that correspond to only a subset of the
UPCs of a brand. As trade deals are usually offered by a lot of manufacturers to their retailers,
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several retailers may engage in price promotions for these UPCs that have been offered to them
on deal. Therefore we may get UPC-components that are mixtures of promoted UPCs across
brands. In that case we also expect to get store-components that refer to different store types, e.g.
HLP-stores (store that engage in frequent price promotions with high and low prices) or EDLP-
stores (stores with every day low prices and in general fewer price promotions than HLP-stores).
The week-components should recover the price promotions of the UPCs, sub-brands, brands and
vendors that appear in one, two or more or even in all stores in certain weeks stimulated by
manufacturers’ trade deals.
Which results do we expect for the core array then? If only one store component is retained in the
three-mode analysis, the core array will be a two-dimensional matrix that characterizes the
manufacturer dominated competition between the UPCs across time within the store-components.
We can not give any assertions for the elements of the two-dimensional core matrix. If a store
component for each store type is retained we will get a lateral core slice for each store type
component. Assuming a three-mode component solution with an EDLP-store-component and a
HLP-store-component the lateral core slice that represents the EDLP-store-component will have
higher entries and (in terms of explained variation) also more important core relations for these
week-components and UPC-components combinations in which the week-components represent
price promotions of the HLP-stores. This expectation is based on the empirical observation that
the deals of the HLP-stores offered to their consumers are expected to be more pronounced than
in the EDLP-stores and therefore may affect the pricing of the EDLP-stores more sharply. The
lateral core slice that represents the HLP-store, on the other hand, should contain the highest core
entries and also the maximum of explained variations for these week-components and UPC-
components combinations in which the week-components represent price promotions in the HLP-
store. This assumption is founded on the empirical observation that EDLP-stores also engage less
frequently in price promotions and that the deals offered to their consumers are not as
pronounced as in the HLP-stores so that the price impact of price promotions in the EDLP-stores
on the pricing behavior in the HLP-stores should not be as strong as vice versa.
17
Hypothesis 6: National brands implicitly coordinate their pricing strategies in order to
compete against regional, local and store brands
This hypothesis implicates that price promotions of the leading national brands are negatively
correlated because they are not promoted at the same time in the same store. This should result in
as many UPC-components as there are leading national brands. Additional UPC-components may
appear if the regional or local brands also engage in price promotions. We are not able to make
any assumptions as to the number of store-components, but we may expect as many store-
components as there are retail chains or as there are different store types. The week-components
represent dominant competitive situations across time and we expect for each national brand -
probably within each single store - a week-component that represents the pricing strategy of that
national brand. In addition to these week-components that represent price activities of the
national brands we expect some week-components that explain the pricing behavior of the
regional, local or store brands. Which results can we assume for the core array then? It depends
on the number of store-components. If we find one store component we should then get higher
core entries for these UPC-components and week-components combinations where the brands
represented by the UPC-components and the brands whose price promotions are described by the
week-components are identical. If we assume as many store-components as there are store-types
we may expect that the relationship between the UPC-components and the week-components as
described for the one store-component solution holds within each slice of the core array.
5.  The empirical study
5.1  The data
The data of our empirical study come from a five store (four chain) suburban market place. The
product category is Frankfurters and we found a sample of 27 UPCs that are sold within all five
stores over a period of 104 weeks. Missing prices due to zero sales have been filled up on the
basis of past prices. All in all, 20.32 percent of prices were missing and had to be inserted into the
data array. The mean prices of the 27 UPCs over the 104 weeks are given in Table 1. This table
also gives a short description of the 27 UPCs with respect to vendor, brand and package size.
Most of the UPCs are national brands and no store brands are included in the sample. The biggest
18
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brands with respect to the number of corresponding UPCs are Oscar Mayer of Philip Morris (6
UPCs), Hygrade Ballpark of Hygrade Food (3 UPCs) and Bests Koshers of Bessin Corporation (8
UPCs). The five stores are labelled as 1419, 1420, 1422, 1423 and 1424 whereas stores 1423 and
1424 are of one chain. Prior analyses of the prices across UPCs and stores have revealed that
store 1422 is a HLP-store with large price variations for most UPCs across time. The chain stores
(1423, 1424) can be described as HHP-stores. Their average prices are above the average prices
of the competing stores for almost all UPCs and their pricing behavior across time reveals
frequent engagement in price promotions (s high-high price strategy). Stores 1419 and 1420 are
on the other hand EDLP-stores. Their UPCs have lower average prices than in the competing
stores and they have engaged in fewer price promotions and smaller price discounts over the
period of 104 weeks.
5.2  The three-mode component analysis
The retail prices of the 27 UPCs in the 5 stores over 104 weeks build the three-mode, three-way
data array for the investigation of the pattern of inter-store competition and it has been analyzed
with the alternating least squares algorithm TUCKALS3. The TUCKALS3-solutions gives the
parameter estimates of the Tucker3-model (see equations 1 and 2). Before applying the
TUCKALS3-algorithm we had to decide on the number of components to retain in each mode.
With respect to this problem we followed the advise of Tucker (1966). The singular values of
each mode of the data set were estimated independently to help determine the proper number of
dimensions in each mode. Therefore, the three-way array was first strung out in three different
ways and singular value decompositions of the three different cross-product matrices were
estimated. All the components prior to the last large drop in the first differences were retained.
This analysis suggested to retain seven components to represent the UPC mode, two components
to represent the store mode and eight components to represent the week-mode. The final
TUCKALS3-solution explained 99.42 percent of the variance underlying the three-way array of
prices.
All component matrices have been VARIMAX-rotated. In our case this rotation method
coincides with the Harris and Kaiser (1964) ortho-oblique rotation that has proved to produce
component matrices of low complexity (e.g. Hakstian 1971, Kiers & ten Berge 1994). The
20
motivation for choosing this rotational transformation is to overcome the possibility of complex
solutions (e.g. some UPCs with high component loadings on many components) because there
are no strong hypotheses in favor for this kind of component structure. The length of each
component has been scaled to be equal to the number of levels in the corresponding mode so that
a value above 1 or below –1 will always indicate an above average influence of this level.
Let us now consider the component matrices of the UPCs, the stores and the weeks before
interpreting the core array. Table 2 contains the VARIMAX-rotated pattern of the UPCs. In the
bottom line of Table 2 we find the standardized component weight which represents the
proportion of explained variation of the corresponding component. These weights add up to the
standardized sums of squares (0.9942 in our case).
The UPC-component structure is mostly organized by brands or sub-brands. To begin with, the
first component, accounting for 39.1 percent of the standardized sums of squares, represents the
brands Bests Kosher and Sinai of Bessin Corporation (UPCs 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23) (also UPC 24
of Vienna Sausage). The 12oz Bests Kosher UPCs and one 16oz Bests Kosher are represented in
the fourth UPC-component that accounts for 24.0 percent of the variation and that is a sub-brand
component. UPC-component “2” accounts for 7.8 percent of the variation and represents both
UPCs of Conagra’s Eckrich brand. It is a brand and also a vendor component. The third UPC-
component accounts for 7.6 percent of the standardized sums of squares and it represents the
Oscar Mayer UPCs 2, 3, and 26 of Philip Morris. The other UPCs of Oscar Mayer (4, 5, 6) are
represented in the additional component “7” that accounts for 8.7 percent of the standardized
sums of squares. In this way Philip Morris’s Oscar Mayer UPCs are split over two components
and the components “3” and “7” therefore represent sub-brand components. UPC-component “5”
is the Hygrade Ballpark component which accounts for 6.7 percent of the variation. It is
interesting to note that component “5” is a brand component and not a vendor component because
the other UPCs of Hygrade Food Products (UPC 13, 27) are not represented in this component.
The last UPC-component to be discussed is UPC-component “6”. It accounts for 5.4 percent of
the sums of squares but it represents only UPC 1, Dubuque Plumpers, which is the only UPC of
FDL Foods Incorporation. We can interpret this component as a brand and as a vendor
component.
21
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Table 3: VARIMAX-rotated component matrix of the stores
Store     Type        C1      C2      C3
1419     (EDLP)      -.17    -.13    1.85
1420     (EDLP)       .17     .13    1.25
1422      (HLP)      -.01    2.22     .04
1423      (HHP)      1.58     .10    -.05
1424      (HHP)      1.57    -.10     .12
Standardized component weight
                     .436     .208    .350
Table 4: Key results of the week-component matrix structure
Week-
Component
Explained
Variation
UPCs Stores
1 15.38 PPs of UPCs 1, 2, 8, 16, 18
PPs of UPCs 6, 20
SPs of UPCs 1 to 12, 26, 27
1419
1423, 1424
1422
2 11.16 PPs of Oscar Mayer UPCs (2, 3, 26) 1423, 1424
3 16.43 PPs of all UPCs of Oscar Mayer 1422
4 16.92 PPs of Eckrich
SPs of Hygrade Ballpark and Oscar
Mayer
1422
1422
5 6.97 PPs of 12oz Bests Kosher 1423, 1424
6 12.36 PPs of Hygrade Ballpark 1422
7 10.18 PPs of Oscar Mayer
SPs of Hygrade Ballpark
1422
1423, 1424
8 10.02 PPs of Hygrade Ballpark All stores
PP = Price promotion    SP  = Shelf prices
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Three components are retained in the store-mode (Table 3) of which the first accounts for 43.6
percent, the second for 20.8 percent and the latter for 35.0 percent of the variation. The overall
store-component structure reveals that the store-components belong to store-types. The first
component obviously represents stores 1423 and 1424, which are HHP-stores. The second
component is the HLP-store-component (store 1422) and the third store-component is the EDLP-
store-component (stores 1419, 1420).
The interpretation of the VARIMAX-rotated component matrix of the weeks is very complicated
because a 104 by 8 matrix has to be interpreted. As mentioned before, the interpretation of the
component loadings has to be done in accordance with the prices and the temporary price
reductions that happen in certain weeks and stores for certain UPCs. For that reason we have
correlated the component loadings with the prices of each UPC in each store as guide line for our
interpretation of the week-component matrix and summarized the key results in Table 4.
The discussion about the key results of the core array is given for the lateral core slices which
represent the inter-structure of the UPC-components and the week-components for the three
store-components (Table 5). We will focus our attention on the explained variation provided by
certain component combinations rather than on the core array elements themselves.
The first lateral slice represents the HHP-store-component. Within this HHP-component all the
week-components are related to the first UPC-component. In addition to that, the fourth UPC-
component is related to week-components 1 to 4 and 6 to 8. These two UPC-components (1 and
4) together represent all the UPCs of Bessin Corporation, which indicates that the HHP-stores
temporarily reduce the prices of Bessin Corporation’s UPCs. The analysis of the core slice
representing the HLP-store-component reveals that the first and fourth UPC-component are
especially related to the week-components 3 and 4. Our conclusion is that the prices of Sinai’s
and Bests Kosher’s UPCs of Bessin Corporation are affected by the prices of the UPCs of the
brands Oscar Mayer, Eckrich and Hygrade Ballpark in the HLP-store which again indicates
strong competition between the major brands in that store. The third lateral core slice which
represents the EDLP-store-component reveals that the UPC-component of the brands Sinai and
Bests Kosher (UPC-component 1 and 4) are highly related to all week-components indicating that
the prices of these brands within the EDLP-stores are highly affected by price promotions in the
HLP-stores and in the HHP-stores.
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Table 5: Lateral Slices of the Core Array (Explained Variation in Percent)
Lateral slice: Store-Component 1 (HHP-store-component)
Week- UPC-Component
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1  2.33   .63   .63  1.63   .49   .39   .54
2  1.79   .38   .11  1.28   .37   .29   .44
3  2.61   .66   .63  1.87   .50   .43   .66
4  2.63   .65   .62  1.89   .55   .45   .66
5  1.19   .32   .21   .41   .27   .17   .29
6  1.97   .43   .47  1.37   .43   .33   .46
7  1.65   .33   .41  1.14   .43   .27   .35
8  1.66   .44   .37  1.18   .25   .27   .42
Lateral slice: Store-Component 2 (HLP-store-component)
Week- UPC-Component
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1  1.31   .29   .37   .80   .24   .22   .28
2  1.02   .18   .16   .72   .12   .06   .20
3  1.43   .30   .12   .96   .26   .07   .16
4  1.47   .09   .30   .96   .31   .07   .36
5   .67   .08   .10   .38   .07   .05   .12
6  1.11   .20   .23   .66   .05   .05   .28
7   .93   .08   .08   .58   .10   .15   .09
8
  .87   .08   .16   .57   .05   .05   .14
Lateral slice: Store-Component 3 (EDLP-store-component)
Week- UPC-Component
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1  2.25   .39   .46  1.01   .36   .28   .47
2  1.65   .30   .29   .93   .26   .24   .38
3  2.40   .46   .42  1.24   .35   .34   .54
4  2.37   .44   .44  1.41   .36   .34   .54
5  1.08   .20   .20   .57   .17   .16   .24
6  1.74   .32   .32   .99   .29   .27   .41
7  1.48   .26   .26   .79   .28   .21   .33
8  1.52   .29   .26   .72   .17   .21   .34
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The general structure of all three lateral core slices also reveals that the week-components that
refer to price promotions in HLP-stores are more influencial on the UPC-components than the
week-components that represent price promotions in the HHP-stores and EDLP-stores. This
refers to stronger competitive impacts of the price promotions in the HLP-stores on the prices in
the HHP-stores and the EDLP-stores.
5.3  Implications of the component and core structure on the hypotheses
On the basis of the previous discussion about the component structure and the core array structure
we know that we will get as many store-components as there are store types (EDLP-stores, HLP-
stores, HHP-stores). The UPC-component matrix reveals a structure that summarizes UPCs to
brand-, sub-brand- and vendor-components. The component structure does not reveal mixtures of
UPCs across brands and vendors within a UPC-component. The week-components stand for the
dominant price activities of certain brands, sub-brands or UPCs in some or all the stores over the
period of 104 weeks. The pattern of the core array indicates that several combinations of the P
UPC-components, the Q store-components and the R week-components are more dominant than
are other combinations.
The theoretical expectations for the component structure and the core array have been given in
section three and are summarized in Table 6. This table also provides the information whether the
theoretical expectations within each hypothesis are fulfilled or not. As can be seen from Table 6
the three-mode component solution does not support hypotheses “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” and “6”
although the theoretical assumptions are partially met for some component matrices. However,
we have to ascertain that the assumptions of hypothesis “5” are supported by the empirical
results. Our three-mode component solution is in congruence with the hypothesis that the
manufacturers have a big impact on the final retail prices (shelf prices and deal prices) by
influencing the number of price-promotions and the prices at the retail level by offering trade
deals to the retailers.
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Table 6: Theoretical expectations of the 6 research hypotheses on the three-mode
component structure and their empirical prove
Hyp. Mode Theoretical expectations Prove
1 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are UPCs or brands 
Stores As many store-components as there are stores or retail chains -
Weeks As many week-components as there are UPC-store-combinations -
Core No dominant component combinations -
2 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are UPCs or brands 
Stores As many store-components as there are stores or retail chains -
Weeks One dominant week-component -
Core First frontal core array provides the maximal information -
3 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are UPCs or brands 
Stores One common store-component -
Weeks As many week-components as there are different pricing strategies of the
UPCs/brands
-
Core No assertions ?
4 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are UPCs or brands 
Stores One common store-component -
Weeks Contrasting/Non-contrasting week-components for negatively/positively
correlated UPC pricing strategies
Core Higher entries in each lateral core slice for these UPC-components and
week-components combinations where the brands represented by the
UPC-components and the brands whose price promotions are described
by the week-components are identical
-
5 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are UPCs, brands, sub-brands or
vendors

Stores As many store-components as there are store-types 
Weeks Week-components should represent price promotions of various UPCs,
sub-brands, brands and vendors within one or more stores

Core Higher elements in each lateral core slice for these week-components
and UPC-components combinations in which the week-components
represent price promotions of the HLP-store-type

6 UPCs As many UPC-components as there are brands, plus some UPC-
components for the regional and local brands

Stores As many store-components as there are retail chains or store-types 
Weeks Week-components that represent the pricing activities of the national
brands and some week-components that explain the pricing strategies of
the regional or local brands
-
Core Higher entries in each lateral core slice for these UPC-components and
week-components combinations where the brands represented by the
UPC-components and the brands whose price promotions are described
by the week-components are identical
-
 /- indicate that the theoretical expections are empirically detected/not detected
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6.  Conclusions
In the present paper the pattern of inter-store competition has been investigated. We have
focussed our attention primarily on the price competition between different retailers within one
trading area and within one product category with special attention on the price impacts between
UPCs within and across stores to determine the extent of price competition.
On the basis of theoretical models that describe the possible pattern of price competition between
UPCs and/or stores across time we have deduced six hypotheses. These six hypotheses postulate
different competitive relations between manufacturers’ UPCs and the retailers, covering different
possible competitive conditions such as competitive independencies or various degrees of
competitive dependency among the UPCs and the retailers. The theoretically derived assumptions
of our research hypotheses have been tested empirically with store-level scanner data from a five-
stores (four chain) suburban market place as basis for our empirical analysis. The prices of
altogether 27 UPCs in the five stores over 104 weeks have been analyzed by using the three-
mode component analysis to determine the basic and important competitive conditions in the
market under study. On the basis of the empirically estimated component structure of the UPCs,
the stores and the weeks as well as on the basis of the core array, which provides the information
of how the components of different modes (here UPCs, stores, and weeks) are related, we were
able to investigate the appropriateness of our six research hypotheses. The empirical results
support the theoretical implications of hypothesis “5” whereas they discard the other five
hypotheses. The fifth hypothesis postulates competition between UPCs and retailers in such a
way that the final retail prices are primarily determined by the manufacturers’ pricing strategies.
Manufacturers are assumed to “set” the retail prices. We have to mention at this point that the
manufacturers do not fix the actual retail price directly, they rather influence the shelf prices and
the number of retailers’ price promotions by offering trade deals to the retailers. The retailers
exert a passive pricing strategy by passing some or most of the trade deals through to the
consumers in that they offer the trade-dealt products at reduced prices to their consumers.
Therefore the manufacturers manage (“set”) the final retail price by deciding on the number and
the size of the trade deals.
The competitive component analysis also shows that price promotions in the EDLP stores and in
the HHP-stores do not affect the prices in the HLP-stores as sharply as the price promotions in
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the HLP-stores would affect the prices in the EDLP- and HHP-stores. The component analysis of
the UPCs reveals that the manufacturers coordinate the prices within the whole brand or within
sub-brands. These sub-brands are determined on brand characteristica such as package size or
brand varieties.
To summarize, the three-mode component analysis has enabled us to investigate the pattern of
inter-store competitions. We have revealed interesting empirical results that are theoretically
founded. A limitation of the analysis is its purely exploratory character. On the basis of the
theoretically derived hypotheses future work may determine a possible component structure and
possible core array structures. These theoretically established three-mode component structures
could then be estimated within a confirmatory three-mode component analysis to determine
whether the theoretically derived three-mode component solution is in acccordance to empirically
observed price pattern.
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